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ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF FEES AND
ACCESS CONTROL UNDER THE FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
ACT OF 1976
Robert C. Anderson* and James A. Wilson**
INTRODUCTION

I.

The continued interest of economists in the private exploitation of
living marine resources arises from the perception that significant social gains would accompany the implementation of a well-designed
resource management plan. Historically the fisheries of the high seas
have been open to all nations. Such open access has led to recurrent
interest in a comprehensive management program, because the unrestrained access to a fishery can lead to a greater than optimal rate of
investment and use.' Private harvesting decisions generally fail to
maximize the social value of a resource exploited through open access. Neither individual fishermen nor national fleets have adequate
incentives to consider their respective impacts on the quality of the
resource or the costs incurred by others. For example, immature fish
are sought along with mature fish on the individual fisherman's theory
that a fish lost today is lost forever. Of course, to society they are not
lost, and the social value of the resource is lowered by the harvest of
immature fish. Would-be fishermen are attracted to the industry when
their expected earnings exceed those in other available activities.
What these new entrants fail to consider is their impact on the fishery
and incomes of other fishermen. The result is overcapitalization of the
industry and increased pressure on the resource base, which can lead
to reductions in breeding stocks and lower harvests.
An open access fishery functions quite differently from ordinary

*

Institute Fellow, Environmental Law Institute; B.A., 1965, Whitman College;

Ph.D., 1968, Claremont University.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Maine.
1. Economists consider the rate of investment and use to be "optimal" when the
largest social value is imputed to the resource; this value is the largest excess of what
the products of the fisheries are worth to present and future consumers over and above

the full costs of harvesting the fish. For a basic review of the economic problems that
arise in the development of common property resources, see Dorfman, The Technical
Basis for Decision Making, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCEs 5
(E. Haefele ed. 1974).
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economic activities. When profits above full costs are earned in an
ordinary activity, new investment is stimulated. In most activities the
new investment takes the form of additions to productive capacity,
and in the long run output is increased. Profitability of a fishery also
attracts new investment, but there are biological limitations on how
much output can be increased without reducing the long-run productivity of the resource. Fisheries investment, therefore, can be excessive
not only from an economic point of view but also from a biological
2
point of view.
In the past, when the profitability of a high seas fishery threatened
its biological productivity international agreements were sought to
impose a variety of controls to reduce the harvest. These controls
usually took the form of restrictions on one or more of the following:
(1) When and where fish could be caught, (2) the minimum or maximum size of fish that could be caught, (3) the gear that could be used,
2. This can be visualized with an effort/yield function, a basic tool of fishery management. For a specified level of effort (input). one may forecast an expected yield or
catch (output). The graphing of the effort/yield function is generally seen as nearly
parabolic.

YIELD

a
b
EFFORT
Point a indicates the effort that will produce the "maximum sustainable yield." i.e., the
level of effort that will result in a harvest which may be taken consistently without
diminishing the stock, thereby rendering the stock perpetually renewable. If fishery investment is such that effort is expended at the b level, yield will decrease and the size
of the fishery will decline. See, e.g., Limited Entry into the Commercial Fisheries (J.C.
Mundt ed., Institute for Marine Studies, University of Washington 1974); Bromley &
Bishop, From Economic Theory to Fisheries Policy: Conceptual Problems and Management Prescriptions, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION

281 (L. Anderson ed. 1977); Christy, Limited Access Systems Under tile Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION, supra at 141; Wilson & Anderson, Fee Management Systems for the
Northwest Atlantic, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION, supra

at 195.
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and (4) the number of fish that could be harvested. 3 Occasionally
some nations limited the entry of fishermen into a fishery. With the
exception of entry limits, none of the control mechanisms adequately
dealt with the impact of new entrants on the incomes of existing fishermen; more often, such regulations had the undesirable side effect of
4
raising fishing costs by mandating the use of inefficient technologies.
Furthermore, traditional forms of control protect the biological productivity of a fishery only to the extent that such restrictions are honored by all participants in the fishery; in practice it proved difficult
to obtain full international cooperation in the management programs
for the fisheries of the high seas.
The failure of traditional forms of regulation to induce economically efficient behavior was not in itself sufficient cause for a change
in basic management strategies. Rather it was the failure to meet the
goal of resource conservation that ultimately provided the impetus for
comprehensive national management programs for the fisheries of the
high seas. 5
In 1976 the United States established a conservation zone, extending from the three-mile territorial limit of the coastal states outward to a 200-mile limit.6 The scope of coverage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 is unique in federal wildlife

law. 7 The Act provides for the continued use of the traditional forms
of regulation8 and adds two important policy options: Fees for fishing
3. Examples of international agreements and controls are the Interamerican Tropical Tuna Commission, which controls seasons and areas among other factors, and the
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, which relies primarily on
quotas and mesh size restrictions. See J. GULLAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE
FISHERIES 156-81 (1974). Similar regulations have been used for fisheries within national territorial seas.
4. For a discussion of the problems with such regulations, see J. CRUTCHFIELD &
G. PONTEcORvo, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES (1969).
5. See Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First
Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427
(1977). Chile was the first nation to claim for itself a 200-mile conservation zone
contiguous to its coast. Later, Peru and Ecuador established similar 200-mile conservation zones to protect their rich fishing grounds from intrusion by foreign fleets.
6. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA), Pub. L. No.
94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (West Supp. 1977)).

7. The Act claims for the United States exclusive management authority over
fish, including "all other forms of marine animal and plant life other than marine
mammals, birds, and highly migratory species," FCMA § 3(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(6)
(West Supp. 1977), within the 197-mile conservation zone, id. § 102(2), 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1812(1). For an excellent historical review of United States fishery and other wildlife law, see M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (Council on Environmental Quality, in press).
8. See FCMA § 303(b)(2)-(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1977).
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rights9 and limitations on entry.1 0 This article is devoted to an analysis

of how these new management tools can be used most effectively as
applied to domestic and foreign fishermen.
II.

ECONOMIC TOOLS FOR MANAGING DOMESTIC
FISHING EFFORT

A. Fees
For domestic fishermen, permits and fees may be imposed." The
Act specifies, however, that the fees charged domestic fishermen may
not exceed the administrative costs incurred by the Secretary of

Commerce in issuing domestic fishing permits.' 2 From an economist's
3
perspective, this requirement is the least desirable feature of the Act,'
as it makes the efficient and equitable management of domestic fisheries much more difficult. Market prices can be relied upon to signal
the relative scarcity of fishery products; but, due to the common property nature of fisheries, fishermen cannot respond to price signals of
scarcity by "planting" more fish and thereby relieving the longer term
problem. Fishermen can respond to higher prices by increased fishing
effort, but often this only creates greater long-run scarcity. Furthermore, individual fishermen may impose other costs on one another
(for example, congestion costs) that are not transmitted through
9. Id. § 303(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853 (b)(1).
10. Id. § 303(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(6).
I1. The Act provides as follows:
Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any Council, or by the Secretary, with respect to any fishery, may(1) require a permit to be obtained from, and fees to be paid to, the Secretary with respect to any fishing vessel of the United States fishing, or wishing to
fish, in the fishery conservation zone, or for anadromous species or Continental
Shelf fishery resources beyond such zone ....
Id. § 303(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(1).
12. Id. § 304(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(d).
13. Inasmuch as both the House and Senate versions of the Act would have permitted fees to be as large as the value of the right conferred, it is somewhat surprising that the conference report adopted such a strict limit on the fee level. See S. REP.
No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26, 35-36 (1975), reprinted in SENATE COMM.
ON COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94th CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 681, 691
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; S. REP. No. 94-711,
94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 89; H.R.
200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra at 796.

However, this limitation is expressed only in terms of fees and might not prohibit recovery of economic rent through taxes. See Burke, Recapture of Economic Rent Under
the FCMA: Sections 303-304 on Permits and Fees, 52 WASH. L. REV. 681 (1977).
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normal market forces. In short, the self-regulating characteristics of
most free markets are not present for common property resources
such as a fishery.
Consequently, economists have suggested that a system of fees or
taxes be used to alter relative market prices in such a way that the
resulting level of fishing effort approximates that in a market with
property rights. 14 As prices rise and fall, so does profitability and, over
the long run, total fishing effort. Hence, the ability to manipulate costs
and prices 15 through taxes and fees implies the ability to control indirectly the level of effort in the fishery.
For example, if fisheries managers find that the unconstrained level
of effort in a fishery exceeds the level compatible with optimum yield,
taxes or fees could be used to increase costs incurred by fishermen,
thereby resulting in lower profits and a reduced level of effort expended in the fishery. It is possible to find a fee or tax level that would
lead to the level of effort necessary to sustain a harvest at the optimum yield determined by fishery managers.
Several advantages result from a fee or taxation approach to management. First, the social value of the resource can be maximized.
The optimum annual harvest of fish can be assured at the least cost to
society; that is, with the most efficient use of capital and labor. Second, a fee or tax system automatically places the benefits of rational
fisheries management in the public treasury, thereby avoiding windfalls for certain elements of the fishing industry. 16 Finally, the tax or
fee approach generates information on catch and levels of fishing effort, which can be useful for "fine tuning" the management system.
One disadvantage of this approach arises when fees are imposed on
an overcapitalized industry. Fees large enough to reduce effort to de14. See, e.g., Bell, Technological Externalities and Common-Property Resources:
An Empirical Study of the U.S. Northern Lobster Fishery, 80 J. POL. ECON. 148
(1972); Copes, Factor Rents, Sole Ownership and the Optimum Level of Fisheries
Exploitation,40 MANCHESTER SCH. ECON. & Soc. STUD. 145 (1972); Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124
(1954); Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116

(1955).
15. Economists typically view taxes as lowering the price received or equivalently
raising the producer's costs.
16. Assuming that effort in an unmanaged fishery will likely be at that level where
revenue equals costs and that a rational management program will produce a level of
reduced effort, an increase in profit (or windfall) will be realized. See note 2 supra.
By gathering this excess profit into the public treasury, a fee or tax system not only
eliminates potential windfalls, but may also promote self-sufficient administration of
the management program.
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sired levels will also result in severe financial hardship for the participants in such a fishery. 1 7 Furthermore, assuming taxation on catch
rather than effort, taxes may be difficult to administer and enforce
unless a fishery is characterized by centralized marketing and processing.
The value of fee systems in controlling the level of fishing effort
(and the allocation of effort among species) should not be underestimated, although considerations of financial hardship may temper the
use of fees as a management tool in overcapitalized fisheries. The Act,
however, effectively rules out the use of fees as a tool for managing
domestic fishing effort by limiting the level of any fees for permits to
the costs incurred in issuing such permits. 18
B. Limitation of Entry
Although the Act does not permit the use of fees to control domestic fishing effort, it does allow the establishment of systems for
limiting access. 19 It should be noted that many of the crab, lobster,
clam, oyster, and other fisheries within the three-mile territorial seas of
17. A fishery becomes overcapitalized once the capacity of the fleet exceeds the
minimum necessary to obtain the optimum yield. A fee works to reduce capacity by
reducing the earnings of the fishermen to less than they could earn in alternative forms
of employment. Some of the fishermen retire their boats and seek jobs elsewhere. In
the process the entire industry suffers capital losses on investment; unemployment
rises; and wage rates fall. Once the capacity has been reduced, the remaining boats
gain in value and wage rates rise, but the level of employment remains permanently
lowered.
18. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
19. See FCMA § 303(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(6) (West Supp. 1977). Although not required by this provision, adoption of access limitation may be necessary
to meet other requirements of the Act. The Act specifies that the Regional Fisheries
Management Councils must manage each fishery to produce the "optimum" yield. Id.
§ 301(a)(l), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(1). The Act defines the optimum yield as the
amount of harvest which provides the greatest overall benefit to the nation in terms
of maximum sustained yield, as modified by relevant economic, social, or ecological
factors. Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18). The Act also reserves for domestic fishermen that part of the optimum yield that can be harvested by the domestic fleet. Id.
§ 303(a)(4). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(4). This will limit the intrusion of foreign fishermen in the conservation zone and ultimately increase the biological abundance of
many species. As the profitability of the fishery increases, new domestic investment will
be attracted; and in order to assure that the optimum yield is not exceeded, the Regional Councils will have to control the amount of such new domestic investment.
This can be done through a continuation of the traditional forms of regulation such
as size, gear, area, and season limitations, but economic waste will increase if the Regional Councils rely solely on traditional management tools, because overcapitalization
will again occur. The only management alternative available to the Regional Councils
that can generate the maximum overall benefit to the nation is the use of entry controls.
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the coastal states are not covered by the Act's provision for limitations
on entry. 20 For fisheries in the 197-mile conservation zone, the Act
provides specific criteria that must be considered in granting access. 21
The intent of limited access programs is to create "shares" in the
fishery equivalent to the level of effort necessary to sustain optimum
yield. Shares may be created in a number of ways-for example,
through the use of fisherman quotas, vessel and gear limits, or licenses. 22 The problem with implementing a limited entry program
arises not from calculating the optimal level of effort or determining
how to obtain it, but rather from the practical difficulties created by

the initial assignment of property rights among a large number of
competing individuals. An abrupt transition from a freely accessible
and overfished state to one of limited access may be neither desirable
nor politically feasible because of likely short term dislocations. Rapid
transitions can be expected to lead to greater unemployment in the
short run than would a more gradual transition relying on labor force
attrition through retirement, death, and alternative employment.
Thus, it would appear desirable to plan for a slow transition in those
23
fisheries presently characterized by overcapitalization.
20. Id. § 101, 306(a), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811, 1856(a). It may prove difficult for
coastal states to enact similar limited entry programs for these and other noncovered
fisheries. See F. Cameron, State and Federal Constitutional Impediments to State
Limited Entry Fisheries Legislation: States from Maine to Virginia (1973) (Marine
Affairs Program, University of Rhode Island); H. Knight & T. Jackson, Legal Impediments to the Use of Interstate Agreements in Coordinated Fisheries Management
Programs: States in the NMFS Southeast Region (1973) (Office of Sea Grant Development, Louisiana State University).
21. The Act states that any fishery management plan may provide as follows:
(6) establish a system for limiting access to the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield if, in developing such system, the Council and the Secretary take into
account(A) present participation in the fishery,
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery,
(C) the economics of the fishery,
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to engage in other fisheries,
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery, and
(F) any other relevant considerations ....
FCMA § 303(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(6) (West Supp. 1977).
22. See Christy, Limited Access Systems Under the Fishery Conservation Act of
1976, in EcONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION 141 (L. Anderson

ed. 1977).
23. During the early years of the Act, United States fleet capacity will be insufficient to harvest the full optimum yield of many species. This presents a unique opportunity for the Regional Councils to implement limited access programs before excessive new entry occurs. Waiting to implement limited access will only exacerbate
the problems of controlling fleet size in the future.
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Historically, these slow transitions have been accomplished by including all current fishermen in the program and then adopting a procedure for license attrition. When no compensation is given for surrendering fishing rights, it is to be expected that rights will be retained
so long as they have some value. If, on the other hand, the fishing
rights could be "bought back" by the state, the attrition process could
be facilitated greatly. In such "buy back" schemes, fees or taxes would
have another distinct advantage. Rather than through forcing the
management authority to rely on general public revenues to finance
the repurchase of fishing rights, a procedure that might arouse significant political opposition, the repurchase could be financed through
fees currently imposed on the fishing industry. Financing "buy back"
programs through industry fees has the additional advantage of
placing the major cost of effort attrition on the major beneficiary, the
remaining fishermen.
A priori reasoning and experience with limited entry programs elsewhere suggest that such programs should generate a considerable economic surplus in the fishery. 2 4 The Act as written does not permit the
use of fees to transfer this surplus to the treasury. Individual coastal
states could attempt to capture some of the surplus by raising landing
fees, but their success would depend upon the simultaneous adoption
of increased landing fees by other coastal states. Attempts by individual states to act alone in raising fees would tend to be self-defeat25
ing, as fishermen would transfer landings to non-fee states.
If governmental agencies are unable to tax away the surplus, the
question becomes which economic agents within the industry-fishermen, dealers, processors, or retailers-will be able to capture the surplus? In much the same way that a tax may be "shifted" from the
shoulders of the person or firm on which it is initially imposed, a surplus may be captured by persons other than those who may appear to
be the recipients. In general, economic surpluses can be earned as
payments to necessary inputs, the supply of which is constrained by
24. Experience in British Columbia suggests that the economic surplus resulting
from entry limitation may be partially dissipated through an expansion in the level of
effort of those granted access. Old boats may be replaced by larger and faster boats,
new gear may be used, and longer hours may be spent fishing. See Christy, supra
note 22, at 152.
25. States with long coastlines, such as Alaska and California. would be better
able to effect a unilateral increase in landing fees without diverting catches to neighboring states.
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regulatory programs, nature, or monopolistic forces. Entry limitation
programs would act as a constraint on effort; this suggests that fishermen could be rewarded with earnings in excess of what they could
earn in other forms of employment. Good harbors and wharf space
represent inputs, the supply of which is controlled by natural forces,
and the owners of such facilities may be able to capture some of the
surplus by raising dock fees.
Monopolistic forces may also affect the distribution of any economic surplus arising under limited entry. Because the buying, processing, and retailing sectors would continue to have no legal constraints on entry, one is tempted to conclude that competition in these
sectors would eliminate any excess profits, with a resulting allocation
of the economic surplus to fishermen and other inputs whose supply is
constrained by natural forces. But the processing industry may be far
from competitive. High transportation costs and traditional patterns
of marketing behavior (including contracts with processors) restrict
the marketing options available to individual fishermen; processors are
thereby able to capture some or all of the surplus in the short run. In
the long run, entry of new processors may be constrained by physical
limitations on wharf space, suitable processing sites, and other market
barriers, with the resulting creation of opportunities for the accrual of
monopoly profits in the processing sector.
The presence of a significant economic surplus in the fishing industry would provide strong incentives for cooperative arrangements
among fishermen to strengthen their relative bargaining positions. 26
Ultimately the market for fresh fish may resemble a bilateral monopoly, as a fishermen's cooperative negotiates with an equally powerful
processor. The outcome of negotiations in such situations cannot be
predicted. It is possible that the very threat of a fishermen's cooperative may induce processors to integrate backward and buy vessels and
entry rights from fishermen. 2 7 It appears that such a backward inte-

26. The legal constraints on bargaining must be examined before one can assess
the likelihood of such cooperative arrangements. Several years ago, Maine lobstermen
struck for higher prices from processors and were successfully prosecuted for restraint
of trade. See United States v. Maine Lobstermen's Ass'n, No. 5-76 (D. Me. 1958).
On the other hand, west coast salmon fishermen have long bargained collectively with
processors.

27. Backward integration of processors into ownership of access rights to raw materials is a relatively common occurrence, especially when the supply of raw materials
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gration may be taking place in the domestic tuna industry, as several
of the large processors have recently acquired their own fishing fleets.
III.

ECONOMIC TOOLS FOR MANAGING FOREIGN
EFFORT
The Act creates a dichotomy in the treatment of foreign and domestic fishermen. For foreign fishermen, a quota will be established
for each species equal to the difference between the optimum yield
and domestic harvesting capacity. 28 This quota will then be allocated
by the Secretary of State in accordance with specified criteria among
foreign nations that apply for fishing permits. 29 Foreign nations
wishing to fish in the conservation zone will be required to pay "reasonable" nondiscriminatory fees for this privilege. 30 Because the fees
charged for foreign fishing permits are limited only in that they be
"reasonable," such fees can be used as a management tool. 31 This Part
discusses the appropriate magnitude of such fees and the basis upon
which they should be assessed.
In principle, fees may be levied on many of the inputs or outputs of
the fishing industry, including man-days at sea, vessel-ton-days at sea,
is limited. For example, Mancke observed that the domestic steel industry acquired
rights to most of the domestic iron ore deposits during the late nineteenth century,
apparently out of fear that an iron ore cartel could be formed. Monopoly profits
earned at that time in the steel industry would otherwise have been captured by the
iron ore cartel. See R. Mancke, The American Iron Ore and Steel Industries: Two
Essays (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T.).
28. FCMA § 201(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d) (WestSupp. 1977).
29. Id. § 201(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e), provides as follows:
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary, shall determine the allocation among foreign nations of the total allowable level of foreign fishing
which is permitted with respect to any fishery subject to the exclusive fishery management authority of the United States. In making any such determination, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary shall consider(1) whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have
traditionally engaged in fishing in such fishery;
(2) whether such nations have cooperated with the United States in, and
made substantial contributions to, fishery research and the identification of fishery resources;
(3) whether such nations have cooperated with the United States in enforcement and with respect to the conservation and management of fishery resources;
and
(4) such other matters as the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
Secretary, deems appropriate.
30. Id. § 204(b)(10), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(I0).
31. In determining the level of fees, the Secretary of Commerce is directed to
consider, inter alia, costs of conservation, management, enforcement, and research.
Id. Reference to such factors, coupled with a general "reasonableness" standard, could
enable the Secretary of Commerce to control foreign fishing.
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variable or fixed costs of effort, the catch in tons, the value of the
catch, and similar parameters. The variables upon which fees could be
levied may be categorized as either measures of inputs to the fishery,
normally denoted by the term "effort," or measures of output, denoted
by the term "catch." It is submitted that fees on catch, if differentiated
by species, are generally preferable.
In theory, fees on either effort or catch could protect the longrun
productivity of the fishery and reduce or eliminate economic inefficiencies in developing the resource. In actual practice, the choice of
fee must be based on the ability of the fee to enhance the overall
objectives of the fishery. Among the factors that should affect the
choice of fee are (1) the choice of variables used to define effort; (2)
the problem of allocating effort by species in a multiple species
fishery; (3) the behavior of fishermen with regard to fee-induced uncertainty; (4) the degree to which the fee depends on accurate biological data, the information provided to fisheries managers about the
state of the fishery, and the degree of administrative flexibility under
changing biological and economic conditions; (5) the costs of administration, surveillance, and enforcement; and (6) whether the fee is nondiscriminatory.
A.

The Problem of Defining Effort

"Fishing effort" may be defined as a composite index of inputs to
harvesting fish. When this index of inputs is constructed in such a way
that the weight applied to each input is the same as the price of the
input, fishing effort is defined as the total cost of hiring the inputs of
capital and labor. For a given expenditure on fishing inputs, the profit
-maximizing fisherman finds the highest attainable level of output.
The relative proportions in which he uses inputs (his "method of production") will be determined partly by the relative costs of inputs.
When effort is so defined and weighted, a tax on effort will produce a
lower level of total industry output, but should not cause the methods
of production of individual fishermen to be changed.
Unfortunately, effort is difficult to define. Furthermore, any definition is subject to continuous revision as technology changes. Thus, a
tax on effort is likely to induce changes in the method of production,
leading to higher total costs for society. In effect, a tax based on an
incomplete definition of effort alters the relative scarcity of factor
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inputs as perceived by the fishermen and encourages them to adopt
methods of production that emphasize the use of nontaxed or underweighted components of effort. In other words, such a tax would
amount to a regulation-induced inefficiency-the very thing econo32
mists hope to avoid.
Taxes on effort may also lead to soiiic loss of management control.
Specifically, the input substitution effects c-eated by the "new" (taxed)
set of ,clativ:. input prices may serve to invlidate predictions of catch
.,Ld on the observation of pre-tax catch relationships. The managei,
, authority may minimize thic Xnpact in the sho - run by limiting
the allowed effort to L,,,s than what would be pr~dic!ed from past
catclh-,!."-r relationships. Over the longer run, m:aaers will have
new data based on the post-tax catch-effort relationship, making the
prediction problem less severe. Of course, if technological change
necessitates continued revision of the definition of effort, the problem
of prediction will remain.
B.

Allocation in a Multiple Species Fishery

A multiple species fishery -is one having more than one target species present at the same time and in which all target species are vulnerable to the same gear. 33 This discussion assumes such fisheries to
be marked by a distribution of species known to the fishermen; that is,
the fishermen can target their effort so that the preponderance of their
catch will be composed of their most desired species. As effort is freely
mobile from one species to another in such a fishery, the managers
must be able to influence the amount of effort targeted at each species
in order to obtain optimum yields thereof. 34 A failure to differentiate
among species could have dire results. Our current problems of selective overfishing reflect the relative profitability of harvests of various
species.

32. See Wilson & Anderson, Fee Management Systems for the Northwest Atlantic,
in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION 195 (L. Anderson ed.
1977).
33. The New England groundfish fishery is an example of such a multiple species
fishery.
34. It is possible to estimate the optimum yield of an ecosystem only if the details
of interspecies competition and predator-prey relationships are known. Present data
bases typically are inadequate for such calculations; therefore, the allocation among
species must be fairly crude in practice.
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Fees or taxes based on the weight of the catch, the value of the
catch, and the total fishing effort are all inadequate for the management purpose of directing relative effort among species in a multiple
species fishery. Two management tools that can ensure the desired
allocation of effort among species are quotas for each species and fees
which vary according to the species caught. Because the allocation of
effort in a multiple species fishery will be a continuing management
problem for the Regional Councils, it deserves more discussion than
some of the other factors that should be considered in the choice and
design of fee systems. For expositional purposes we have chosen a
static model to support the discussion. Such a model considers only
the costs and revenues for harvests in one time period; any impacts on
longrun productivity are ignored. Such a model has the twin virtues of
simplicity and of yielding correct answers for the more complex dynamic case.
Figure 1 depicts the relevant cost and revenue functions for a twospecies fishery. The value of the resource is maximized when the difference between revenue and cost is maximized (effort equals maximum economic yield level). To restrain effort from expanding beyond that level which maximizes the value of the resource, a fee in the
amount Ta on each unit of effort directed at species A and Tb on each
unit of effort directed at species B must be imposed. Such fees force
the individual fishermen to equate their marginal costs of fishing with
their marginal contribution to the total industry revenue for each species. 35
As the figure is drawn, the level of the fee must vary between the
two species. The fee on effort directed at species B should be much
larger than that for species A. The important feature to be noticed is
that to be able to allocate effort properly between the two species, the
fee must be based on a difference between revenues and costs. Fees
which are based on the weight of the catch clearly fail this test, as do
fees applied uniformly to effort irrespective of where it is targeted.
Fees based on the value of the catch are better in that they incorporate at least one of the important parameters; nonetheless, such fees
make no allowance for differences in the costs of catching the different species.
35. Without a fee, the individual fishermen will continue to increase effort until
they perceive that there are no more profits to be earned. This is the level of effort
where average revenue equals marginal cost.
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A similar allocation problem occurs with the so-called "by-catch
phenomenon." By-catch is usually defined as catch that is incidental
to the catch of the targeted species; for example, haddock in a cod
fishery. Quota systems usually make allowance for a reasonable bycatch by establishing a separate by-catch quota. When the market
price of the by-catch equals or exceeds the price of the target species,
however, one suspects that economic factors are as important as biological factors in determining the size of by-catch. To the extent that
the problem is an economic one, it is really a question of allocation.
Fees on effort cannot be used to attack the problem; fees on catch
have the potential, at least, of minimizing the economic aspects of the
problem.
C.

Considerationof Uncertainty

The ultimate allocation of uncertainty 36 between the taxing authority and the foreign fishermen may significantly affect the amount
foreign fishermen are willing to pay for fishing rights. It may, therefore, be an important test of the desirability of alternative fee systems.3 7 In the highly simplified model discussed herein a fee or tax
based on effort increases the risk borne by individual fishermen relative to taxes based on actual catch. By shifting the burden of uncertainty from fishermen to the taxing authority, a fee on actual catch
should result in higher receipts than a fee on the effort which, on average, produces the same level of catch. 38
D.

Fees and Biological Data

Optimum yields and hence the level of fees depend on a thorough
knowledge of the fishery ecosystems. The quality of data preferred by
36. We do not distinguish between uncertainty and risk. As we use the terms, uncertainty and risk arise when the outcome of a situation is subject to an estimate of
its probability; for example, a 50% chance of getting heads on a coin flip.
37. For an investigation of how fees or taxes based on actual catch and on effort
affected the allocation of risk between fishermen and the resource owner, see Wilson
& Anderson, supra note 32.
38. The allocation of risk may have serious operational consequences. A taxpayer
under a high-risk system is likely to view the entire process as either very unfair or
as an ill-defined game in which one element-the fee-is capriciously determined. Both
perceptions would encourage tax avoidance behavior, leading to a need for greater
enforcement and surveillance expenses.
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economists is normally unavailable. Biologists can make general statements about the condition of the fishery as well as the direction of
recent changes and, in some cases, probably future changes. But most
reputable biologists will shy away from the precise estimates of fishery
parameters that naive economists demand. Consequently, the optimum yields of any fishery are subject to considerable uncertainty.
Given such uncertainty, preference should be given to a fee system
which (1) does not require highly accurate biological information, but
(2) generates accurate information on the state of the fishery. Fees on
catch, differentiated by species, would be the most useful in terms of
producing new information, but they would require the estimation
and establishment of separate schedules for each species-more information than would be required for fees based on effort. The method
of fee assessment should also be scrutinized with regard to its effect on
other anticipated forms of regulation. 39
The interaction between regulations and the fee system will take
place in two spheres: management and administration/enforcement. In
the management sphere, fisheries biologists will use devices such as
quotas to try to make harvests correspond with a predetermined level
of "optimum" yield. As economists, we may be tempted to argue that
a well-designed fee system can better accomplish the same objective,
and in principle this is true. As an actual matter, however, our ability
to implement such a system is seriously constrained by a lack of adequate data, by a paucity of predictive and reliable models of foreign
fleet harvesting, and, of course, by the legal mandate. 40 Consequently,
the most reasonable approach is to ensure that fee systems may be
used to reinforce and complement other management tools. This
means that fee systems should be designed as if they were the sole
management tool.4 1 It also means that fees, quotas, and other regulatory tools can be used to backstop one another.
The fee system will also interact with administrative and enforcement devices and thus will affect data collection, inspection, and sur39.

Continued regulation in the form of quotas with respect to foreign fleets is

assured by the method of determining access rights outlined in the Act, as well as by

conventional practice among fisheries managers. See FCMA § 201, 16 U.S.C.A. §
1821 (West Supp. 1977). Mesh size regulations and perhaps seasonal closures can
also be expected.
40. See, e.g., id. § 301(a)(5),

16 U.S.C.A. §1851(a)(5) (no conservation and

management measure "shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose").
41. In practice, this may not always be possible. Consider the externality posed
by the premature capture of young fish. Although it is in the interests of the industry
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veillance. As a quota system requires that data be collected on catch
by species, there is reason to believe that fees based on catch rather
than effort would reduce information and surveillance costs, especially if the measure of effort is a complex system of weights attached
to various fishery inputs.
E. NondiscriminatoryFees
The Act states that fees shall apply nondiscriminatorily to each foreign nation. 42 Nondiscrimination should mean that each foreign nation pays identical fees for identical fishing rights. But what are identical fishing rights? Is the harvest of one ton of cod by a modern purse
seiner equivalent to the same catch by handlines? Do fishing rights
depend on the costs incurred by the two fishermen? Charging identical
prices to all nations for the rights to harvest a given catch would be
nondiscriminatory. If fees were based on vessel costs or other factors
which vary from one nation's fleet to another, they could be interpreted as being discriminatory. Thus, fees based on the age or tonnage
of a vessel, distance to port, crew size, and so forth could potentially
discriminate among nations for the rights to identical quantities of fish
and should not be permitted under the Act.
IV.

SUMMARY

Congress decision to prohibit the application of fees to domestic
fishermen is, in our opinion and that of most resource economists,
unfortunate. The prohibition removes or impedes the application of
management policies that could lead to more efficient and equitable
fisheries. Among these prohibited policies is a system of fees which
to permit the young to survive for harvest at a later date (the rate of increase in value
of the young exceeding the rate of return on alternative investment opportunities of
the industry), individual fishermen have no such incentive to avoid the capture of
young fish. To the individual fishermen a juvenile fish permitted to escape a net is a fish
lost forever; any price received for the fish that covers the variable costs of harvest
justifies its capture. A system of taxes or fees designed to protect the young fish must
be based on the type of gear used rather than the actual landings of fish. That mesh
size regulations should be used in conjunction with taxes or fees has been argued in
Turvey, Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation, 54 AM. EcON. REV.
64, 69-70 (1964). See also Christy, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976: Management Objectives and the Distributionof Benefits and Costs, 52 WASH.
L. REV. 657 (1977).
42. FCMA § 204(b)(10), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(10) (West Supp. 1977).
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simultaneously would remove the surplus value and maintain effort at
an efficient level. The Act prohibits the use of fees to facilitate the
transition and to equalize the burden of costs and benefits in those instances when the management authority attempts to make the transition from overfishing to optimum yield through the application of limited access programs.
As far as the application of fees to foreigners is concerned, the application of fees to catch rather than to effort is preferable. This preference is not absolute, however, and is subject to trade-offs that are
difficult to quantify. The primary reason for preferring catch fees is
the problem of species allocation in multiple species fisheries. Most
important United States fisheries are multiple species fisheries. Selective overfishing has been severe in the past and will continue to be a
problem absent a method to allocate catch by species. Fees on effort
would not alleviate the allocation problem. Fees on catch, on the
other hand, could, alter the allocation of catch and make by-catches
truly incidental. Benefits of fees on catch, however, can probably be
had only through more rigorous enforcement and surveillance. Because the cost of enforcement and surveillance does not relate solely
to fees, the operational trade-off concerns only the additional expenses necessary.
Another consideration favoring fees on catch is the likelihood that
fees based on effort would be based on an inadequate index of effort
and would thus cause inefficiency. Also, our current knowledge of
catch-effort relationships and of the production functions of the foreign fleets is so sparse that any attempts to tax effort would probably
be confounded by input substitutions by the foreign fleets. Once again
the trade-off appears to be between some loss of management control
and the expense of exercising control.
Effort-based fees would also involve more uncertainty. The rather
simple model presented earlier conforms with the intuitive judgment
that fees on catch reduce the risk to the fisherman and presumably
raise his willingness to pay to fish. More tentatively, risk-minimizing
fee systems may be viewed as more equitable and consequently are
likely to require less enforcement and surveillance. There is no tradeoff here between fees on catch and fees on effort-fees on catch are
clearly superior.
Fees on catch also appear less dependent on accurate biological
information and more compatible with other data collection needs.
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Finally, the legal requirement of nondiscrimination among foreign
fleets is easily satisfied by fees on catch. In sum, there is a strong case
for assessing fees on the basis of catch, based on a judgment that fees
on catch will lead to more rational management of the resource.
V.

POSTSCRIPT

To date the only significant official development has been the publication by the National Marine Fisheries Service of a draft fee
schedule for foreign vessels. 43 In light of the analysis in this discussion, certain observations regarding this proposed three-part fee structure are appropriate. First, each foreign nation would pay an annual
fee for access equal to $1 per gross registered ton for all vessels for
which a permit is requested. An upper limit of $5,000 would be
placed on this fee so that large support vessels would not pay excessively large fees. Second, each foreign nation would be required to
pay an amount equal to 3.5 percent of the ex-vessel value of the catch
of the various surplus species allocated to that nation. Third, each
foreign nation would have to pay for the costs of placing United States
observers aboard its vessels. The estimated revenue from each provision is $2 million, $19 million, and $0.75 million respectively. In addition to the fees, each foreign nation would be required to return to
the sea any incidental catch of species not allocated to that nation.
A fee on vessel size should be viewed as a fee on one component of
fishing effort. The analysis of this paper demonstrates that fees on effort are generally undesirable. Perhaps the most obvious flaw in this
particular measure is that it creates an incentive for foreign nations to
reduce the taxed factor, which is boat size, and increase the untaxed
factors, including crew size, gear carried, vessel speed, and the like.
Fortunately, the distortions in efficiency created by this particular
component of the fee should be small in view of its nominal size.
The fee on catch is to be based on estimated ex-vessel value of the
catch allocated to each nation. Such a provision is desirable, and it is
proper that this portion of the fee predominates over the portion based
on effort. The only apparent weakness of fees based on the value of
catch is that they are inadequate for guiding effort among species in a
multiple species fishery.
43.
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Because fees will be assessed as a percentage of value, and value will
vary from species to species, the regulations properly create a fee
schedule differentiated by species. Nevertheless, it would be possible
to alter the fee for each species in line with the biological state of the
species (higher percentages of value for overfished species, perhaps
lower for underfished) and thereby use the fee system to reinforce the
species quota system. If the quota system proves as deficient under our
jurisdiction as it has been under international jurisdiction, this use of
fees will probably be required.
The treatment of the incidental catch is truly unfortunate. The requirement that any incidental catch not covered by the permits be returned to the sea will result in an unnecessary waste of valuable resources. If the incidental catch could survive the experience of being
caught and released, there would be no objection to this regulation.
Regrettably, most fish cannot be expected to survive such treatment,
with the result that resources which are valuable as a source of protein
for mankind will be wasted. Rather than returning these fish to the
sea, it is preferable that their full economic value be realized. An alternative would be to give the foreign vessels a choice between (1) delivering the incidental catch to United States ports and (2) retaining
them aboard and making an additional payment of some amount less
than the wholesale value of the fish in world markets.
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